This paper employs a multi-country large scale Overlapping Generations model with uninsurable labor productivity and mortality risk to quantify the impact of the demographic transition towards an older population in industrialized countries on world-wide rates of return, international capital ‡ows and the distribution of wealth and welfare in the OECD. We …nd that for the U.S. as an open economy, rates of return are predicted to decline by 86 basis points between 2005 and 2080 and wages increase by about 4.1%. If the U.S. were a closed economy, rates of return would decline and wages increase by less. This is due to the fact that other regions in the OECD will age even more rapidly; therefore the U.S. is "importing" the more severe demographic transition from the rest of the OECD in the form of larger factor price changes. In terms of welfare, our model suggests that young agents with little assets and currently low labor productivity gain, up to 1% in consumption, from higher wages associated with population aging. Older, asset-rich households tend to lose, because of the predicted decline in real returns to capital. 
Introduction
In all major industrialized countries the population is aging, over time reducing the fraction of the population in working age. This process is driven by falling mortality rates followed by a decline in birth rates, which reduces population growth rates (and even turn them negative in some countries). While demographic change occurs in all countries in the world, extent and timing di¤er substantially. Europe and some Asian countries have almost passed the closing stages of the demographic transition process while Latin America and Africa are only at the beginning (Bloom and Williamson, 1998 ; United Nations, 2002). Figure 1 , based on UN population projections, illustrates the di¤erential impact of demographic change on population growth rates (de…ned here as the growth rate of the adult population) for the period 2000-2080 for four regions of the world that comprise the entire world: the U.S., the European Union (EU), the rest of the OECD (ROECD) and the rest of the world (ROW). Population growth rates are predicted to decline in all regions, but are positive in the U.S. and in the ROW region throughout the 21st century, whereas they fall below zero in the EU in about 2016 and in the ROECD in about 2042. As a consequence, the population in the EU (the ROECD) starts shrinking in about 2016 (2042), whereas the population in the other two regions continues to increase. Figure 2 shows the impact of demographic change on working-age population ratios -the ratio of the working-age population (of age to the total adult population (of age . This indicator, which will turn out to be crucial in our analysis, illustrates that the EU is the oldest, whereas the ROW is the youngest region in terms of the relative size of the working-age population. The United States and the rest of the OECD region initially have the same level of working-age population ratios, but the dynamics of demographic change di¤er substantially in the U.S. relative to the other regions. While workingage population ratios decrease across all regions, the speed of this decrease signi…cantly slows down for the U.S. in about 2030. What are the welfare consequences of living in a world where the population is aging rapidly? First, individuals live longer lives and tend to have fewer children, which are the underlying reasons of aging populations. The welfare e¤ects of these changes are hard to quantify. Second, due to changes in the population structure, aggregate labor supply and aggregate savings is bound to change, with ensuing changes in factor prices for labor and capital. Speci…cally, labor is expected to be scarce, relative to capital, with an ensuing increase in real wages and decline in the real return on capital. The primary objective of this paper is to quantify the distributional and welfare consequences from this second, general equilibrium e¤ect of the demographic changes around the world.
To this end, we use demographic projections from the United Nations, together with a large scale Overlapping Generations Model pioneered by Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987) . We extend the model to a multi-country version, as in Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) , among many others, and also enrich the model by uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty, as in Imrohoroglu et al. (1995) , Imrohoroglu et al. (1999) , Conesa and Krueger (1999) and others. Both extensions are necessary for the question we want to address. First, uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty will endogenously give rise to some agents deriving most of their income from returns to capital, while the income of others is mainly composed of labor income. Abstracting from this heterogeneity does not allow a meaningful analysis of the distributional consequences of changes in factor prices. This feature also adds a precautionary savings motive to the standard life-cycle savings motive of households, which makes life cycle savings pro…les generated by the model more realistic. Second, in light of potential di¤erences in the evolution of the age distribution of households across regions, it is important to allow for capital to ‡ow across regions. In our model capital can freely ‡ow between di¤erent regions in the OECD (the U.S., the EU and the rest of the OECD). These capital ‡ows may mitigate the decline in rates of return and the increase in real wages one would expect in the U.S. if it were a closed economy.
We …nd exactly the opposite. In the U.S. as an open economy, rates of return are predicted to decline by 86 basis points between 2005 and 2080: If the U.S. were a closed economy, this decline would amount to only 79 basis points. This result is due to the fact that other regions in the OECD will age even more rapidly. Therefore the U.S. is "importing" the more severe aging problem from these regions via a stronger increase in wages and a stronger decline in interest rates, relative to being a closed economy.
In order to evaluate the welfare consequences of the demographic transition we ask the following question: suppose a household economically born in 2005 would live through the economic transition with changing factor prices induced by the demographic change (but keeping its own survival probabilities constant at their 2005 values), how would its welfare have changed, relative to a situation without a demographic transition? We …nd that for young households with little assets the increase in wages dominates the decline in rates of return. Abstracting from social security and its reform newborns in 2005 gain in the order of 0.6-0.9% in terms of lifetime consumption. Older, asset-rich individuals, on the other hand, tend to lose because of the decline in interest rates. If the demographic transition, in addition, makes a reform of the social security system necessary, then falling bene…ts or increasing taxes reduce the welfare gains for newborn agents. An increase in the retirement age to 70, on the other hand, mitigates some of these negative consequences.
Our paper borrows model elements from, and contributes to, three strands of the literature. Starting with Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987) a vast number of papers has used large-scale OLG models to analyze the transition path of an economy induced by a policy reform. Examples include social security reform (see e.g. Conesa and Krueger (1999) ), fundamental tax reform (see e.g. Altig et al. (2001) , Conesa and Krueger (2005) ) and many others.
A second strand of the literature (often using the general methodology of the …rst strand) has focused on the economic consequences of population aging in closed economies, often paying special attention to the adjustments required in the social security system due to demographic shifts. Important examples include Huang et al. (1997) , De Nardi et al. (1999) , and, with respect to asset prices, Abel (2003) .
The contributions discussed so far assume that the economy under investigation is closed to international capital ‡ows. However, as the population ages at di¤erent pace in various regions of the world one would expect capital to ‡ow across these regions. The third strand of the literature our paper touches upon therefore is the large body of work in international macroeconomics studying the direction, size, cause and consequences of international capital ‡ows and current account dynamics, reviewed comprehensively in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) .
Our paper is most closely related to work that combines these three strands of the literature, by using the methodology of large scale OLG models to study the consequences of demographic change in open economies. The work by Attanasio et al. (2006b) constructs a two region (the North and the South) OLG model to study the allocative and welfare consequences of di¤erent social security reforms in an open economy. Compared to their model, we include endogenous labor supply and idiosyncratic income shocks. While we also have to take a stand on how the social security system deals with the aging of the population, these social security reforms are not in the center of our analysis whereas their paper focuses on this issue. In Attanasio et al. to explain historical capital ‡ow data with changes in demographics, rather than, as we do, to study the (welfare and distributional) implications of future changes in demographics. Relative to this literature, we see the contribution of our paper in evaluating the welfare consequences of the demographic transition per se and not just the alternative social security reform scenarios, as well as in the analysis of the distributional consequences of changing factor prices due to population aging.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we construct a simple, analytically tractable multi-country OLG model to isolate the key determinants of international capital ‡ows and the impact of changes in the demographic structure on rates of return and capital ‡ows. Section 3 contains the description of our large scale simulation model. Section 4 discusses the calibration of the model and section 5 presents results for the benchmark model. In section 6 we compare our results to what would be obtained in a closed economy model.
There we also disentangle the e¤ects from changing fertility and mortality. Section 7 concludes, and separate appendices contain more detailed information about the demographic model underlying our simulations, as well as details of the computational strategy and calibration of the model.
A Simple Model
We now construct a simple OLG model that is a special case of our quantitative model in the next section. We can characterize equilibria in this model analytically, and are especially interested in the in ‡uence of demographic variables and the size of the social security system on rates of return to capital and the dynamics of international capital ‡ows. The results of this simple model will provide some intuition for the quantitative results from the simulation model.
In every country i there are N t; i young households who live for two periods and have preferences over consumption c 
where r t+1 is the real interest rate between period t and t + 1 and ¿ t;i is the social security tax rate in country i: We assume that capital ‡ows freely across countries, and thus the real interest rate is equalized across the world. The production function in each country is given by
where Z i is the country-speci…c technology level and A t = (1+g) t is exogenously growing productivity. Thus we allow for di¤erences in technology levels across countries, but not its growth rate. We further assume that capital depreciates fully after its use in production. The production technology in each country is operated by a representative …rm that behaves competitively in product and factor markets. Pro…t maximization of …rms therefore implies that
where
is the capital stock per e¢ciency unit of labor.
We assume that the social security system is a pure pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system that balances the budget in every period. Therefore ¿ t; i w t;i N t;i = b t;i N t¡1 ;i :
Finally, market clearing in the world capital market requires that
Analysis
Equilibria in this model can be characterized analytically. To do so we …rst solve the household problem and then aggregate across households (countries).
Optimal Household Savings Behavior
Optimal saving of the young in country i are given as
The budget constraint of the social security system implies that
where°N t;i is the gross growth rate of the young cohort in country i between period t ¡ 1 and t: It also measures the working age to population ratio (the higher is°N t;i ; the higher is that ratio) 1 , which allows us to map the predictions of this model to the data plotted in …gure 2: Using the expression for bene…ts and substituting out for wages and interest rates from (1) in (2) yields
1 The population of a country i at time t is given by P op t;i = N t;i + N t¡1;i and the working age to population ratio is given by
Then we can easily compute the growth rate of the population as°P : Thus°N i is a measure both of the population growth rate as well as the working age to population ratio.
Aggregation
For further reference, de…ne byÑ t = P i Z i N t;i the e¢ciency weighted world population, byμ t; i = Zi Nt;ĩ N t =Ñ t;ĩ Nt the relative share of the e¢ciency-weighted population in country i and by°N t =Ñ
Using this in (4) and simplifying yields
is the fraction of output per e¤ective worker that is saved. Here ¿ a t = P i ¿ t;iμ t;i denotes the average social security contribution rate in the world and°A = 1+ g is the growth rate of technology. Equation (5); as a function of the policy and demographic parameters of the model, describes the dynamics of the aggregate capital stock, given the initial condition k 0 : 2 Since, from the …rms' …rst order condition, interest rates are given by 1 + r t = ®k ®¡ 1 t the dynamics of the real interest rate are given by
with initial condition 1 + r 0 = ®k where
where s ¡1;i N ¡1;i denotes total assets held by the initial old generation in country i:
Evidently, normalized and productivity de-trended per capita output in country i is then given by
To gain further intuition it is instructive to relate rates of return to savings rates along a BGP. World saving (equal to investment) is given by
and along a BGP capital grows at a constant rate°A°N ; so that
Thus the world-wide saving (investment) rate along the BGP is given by
which shows that interest rates and savings rates are negatively related: a higher savings rate, ceteris paribus, increases the supply of capital and thus depresses the rate of return. Of course both the interest rate and the world savings rate are endogenous, and functions of the underlying parameters. It directly follows that along the BGP
Furthermore, we can characterize international capital ‡ows and the current account. De…ne savings and investment rates as well as the current account (as fraction of output) in country i as
Along a BGP we can determine, after some tedious algebra,
Finally, net foreign asset positions and the current account in the BGP are related according to
and thus
Qualitative Predictions from the Simple Model
In this section we illustrate, using equations (8)- (14) , how an aging population (as captured by a decline in°N ), or an increase in social security contribution rates induced by demographic changes (as captured by an increase in ¿) a¤ects world-wide rates of return, country-speci…c per capita output, savings and investment rates as well as the current account and the net foreign asset position.
Rates of Return
First we determine the consequences of a decline in the working age to population ratio in the BGP. From equation (10) we immediately see that despite the fact that the interest rate and the savings rate are negatively related (see equation (8)), a decline in the working age to population ratio°N leads to both a decline in the rate of return r and in the saving rate sr: What is the intuition? A reduction of°N reduces the number of young people relative to old people. Since savings is only done by the young, the savings rate in the economy declines. This makes capital scarce and, ceteris paribus, increases r (see equation 8). But there is the direct e¤ect on the interest rate r: a reduction of°N reduces labor supply tomorrow (as there are fewer young), making labor scarce relative to capital. In the simple model of this section this e¤ect is theoretically shown to dominate, and hence r falls. Equation (10) shows another potential, indirect e¤ect from population aging on the interest rate that stems from the social security system. An increase in the (world average) social security contribution rate ¿ a ; by reducing private savings rates, is predicted to drive up rates of return. If policy makers want to keep social security bene…ts stable despite an aging population, an increase in contribution rates is required. Because this, ceteris paribus, drives up future rates of return, the adjustment of ¿ a mitigates or even dominates the direct e¤ect of population aging via a decline of°N , as also highlighted by Fehr et al. (2005) . 3 To summarize, a decline in the world-wide working age to population ratio leads to a decline in rates of return to capital, as long as social security contribution rates are held constant (and thus bene…ts shrink). If, however, contribution rates are raised in addition, to keep social security bene…ts stable, the predicted decline in returns is smaller, or returns may even increase. Quantitative work is needed to measure the relative strength of these e¤ects, something we will turn to in the next sections of this paper.
Per Capita Output
The simple decomposition in equation (7) illustrates the various channels through which demographic change a¤ects per capita output in country i. As the most direct e¤ect, a decrease in the working age to population ratio in country i as measured by°N i leads to a decrease of the overall population which means that the existing resources have to be shared by less people. However, the decrease of the working age to population ratio also directly reduces the labor force which suppresses overall output. An additional positive e¤ect on per capita output stems from capital depending because decreasing°N i ; through its e¤ect on°N ; leads to an increase of ¾ and thereby to an increase of the long-run capital capital stock per e¢cient worker, k. Finally, an additional indirect e¤ect already familiar from the above discussion on rates of return emanates from increases in contribution rates, ¿ a , if social security bene…t levels were to be maintained. This harms capital accumulation. Again, quantitative work is needed to measure the relative strengths of these various e¤ects.
Net Foreign Asset Positions
Finally we want to deduce the implications of the simple model for the current account and net foreign asset positions across countries. First we observe from equations (13) and (14) that if all countries are identical with respect to their demographic structure and size of the social security system, then the current account and the net foreign asset positions are equal to zero. Thus the only reason for capital to ‡ow across countries in our model are di¤erences in demographics and in the size of the social security system.
What are the consequences of a reduction in the working age to population ratio°N i ; abstracting from social security (that is, setting ¿ i = ¿ a = 0)? 4 We observe from equations (11) and (12) that both investment as well as savings rates decline with a decrease in°N i ; for the same reason as the world savings rate decreased above. What happens to the current account and the net foreign asset position of country i depends on whether it is aging faster or slower than the rest of the world. If all countries age at the same speed (the ratio°N i =°N remains unchanged) then the net foreign asset position remains unchanged and the current account declines in absolute value. If, on the other hand, country i ages faster than the rest (°N i =°N decreases), then its net foreign asset position and its current account increase: capital ‡ows from regions that are aging faster to regions that are aging slower. Notice that the term°N i =°N appears in equation (11) but not in equation (12) which illustrates that the strength of demographic change in country i relative to the other world regions directly a¤ects investment rates but not savings rates.
Finally, if all countries have identical working age to population ratios (°N i =°N remains at 1), but country i increases its social security contribution rate ¿ i then (assuming for simplicity ¿ a = 0) we observe from equations (11)- (14) that country i's investment rate remains unchanged, its private savings rate sr i declines, and with it the current account and the net foreign asset position. We will later use these qualitative predictions from the simple model to interpret our results from the quantitative model to which we turn next.
The Quantitative Model
In this section we describe the quantitative model we use to evaluate the consequences of demographic changes for international capital ‡ows, returns to capital and wages, as well as the welfare consequences emanating from these changes. In our quantitative work we consider three countries/regions: the United States (U.S.), the European Union (EU) and the rest of the OECD (ROECD).
Demographics
The demographic evolution in our model is taken as exogenous (i.e. we do not model fertility, mortality or migration) and is the main driving force of our model. Households start their economic life at age 20; retire at age 65 and live at most until age 95. Since we do not model childhood of a household explicitly, we denote its twentieth year of life by j = 0; its retirement age by jr = 45 and the terminal age of life by J = 75. Households face an idiosyncratic, time-and country-dependent (conditional) probability to survive from age j to age j + 1; which we denote by s t; j;i :
For each country i we have data or forecasts for populations of model age j 2 f0;: : : ; 75g in years 1950; :: : ; 2300. From now on we denote year 1950 as our base year t = 0 and year 2300 as the …nal period T and the demographic data for periods t 2 f0; : : :; T g by Nt;j;i. For simplicity, we assume that all migration takes place at or before age j = 0 in the model (age 20 in the data), so that we can treat migrants and agents born inside the country of interest symmetrically.
Technology
In each country the single consumption good is being produced according to a standard neoclassical production function
where Y t;i is output in country i at date t, K t;i and L t;i are capital and labor inputs and A t is total labor productivity, growing at a constant country independent rate g. The scaling parameters Z i control relative total factor productivities across countries, whereas the parameter ® measures the capital share and is assumed to be constant over time and across countries. In each country capital used in production depreciates at a common rate ±. Since production takes place with a constant-returns to scale production function and since we assume perfect competition, the number of …rms is indeterminate in equilibrium and, without loss of generality, we assume that a single representative …rm operates within each country.
Endowments and Preferences
Households value consumption and leisure over the life cycle fc j ; 1¡l j g according to a standard time-separable utility function
where¯is the raw time discount factor and expectations are taken over idiosyncratic mortality shocks and stochastic labor productivity. In particular, the expectations operator E encompasses the survival probabilities s t; j;i : Households are heterogenous with respect to age, a deterministic earnings potential and stochastic labor productivity. These sources of heterogeneity a¤ect a household's labor productivity which is given by
First, households labor productivity di¤ers according to their age: " j denotes average age-speci…c productivity of cohort j. Second, each household belongs to a particular group k 2 f1; : :: ; Kg that shares the same average productivity µ k . Di¤erences in groups stand in for di¤erences in education or ability, characteristics that are …xed at entry into the labor market and a¤ect a group's relative wage. We introduce these di¤erences in order to generate part of the cross-sectional income and thus wealth dispersion that does not come from our last source of heterogeneity, idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Lastly, a household's labor productivity is a¤ected by an idiosyncratic shock,´2 f1; : : : ;Eg that follows a time-invariant Markov chain with transition probabilities
We denote by ¦ the unique invariant distribution associated with ¼.
Government Policies
The government collects assets of households that die before age J and redistributes them in a lump-sum fashion among the citizens of the country as accidental bequests, h t;i (inheritances). Furthermore, we explore how our results are a¤ected by the presence and the design of a pure pay-as-you-go public pension system, whose taxes and bene…ts have to be adjusted to the demographic changes in each country. The social security system is modelled as follows. On the revenue side, households pay a ‡at payroll tax rate ¿ t;i on their labor earnings. Retired households receive bene…ts, b t;k ;i , that are assumed to depend on the household type, µ k , but are independent of the history of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Pension bene…ts are therefore given by
where ½ t;i is the pension system's net replacement rate. We assume that the budget of the pension system is balanced at all times such that taxes and bene…ts are related by
where N t;j ;k ;i denotes the population in country i at time t of age j and type k.
In our results section we distinguish between three di¤erent scenarios for the future evolution of the social security system, one in which taxes are held constant and replacement rates adjust accordingly, and vice versa. A third scenario models an increase in the retirement age (and in addition adjusts bene…ts, if needed, to assure budget balance). The results from the simple model above suggests that our results will be signi…cantly a¤ected by the modelling choice for social security.
Market Structure
In each period there are spot markets for the consumption good, for labor and for capital services. While the labor market is a national market where labor demand and labor supply are equalized country by country, the markets for the consumption good and capital services are international where goods and capital ‡ow freely, and without any transaction costs, between countries. The supply of capital for production stems from households in all countries who purchase these assets in order to save for retirement and to smooth idiosyncratic productivity shocks. As sensitivity analysis, we explore how countries would be a¤ected by their demographic changes if they were closed economies where capital stocks and accumulated assets coincide by de…nition.
Equilibrium
Individual households, at the beginning of period t are indexed by their age j, their group k, their country of origin i, their idiosyncratic productivity chock´, and their asset holdings a. Thus their maximization problem reads as W (t; j; k; i;´; a)
= max c;a 0 ;1¡l
Here w t;i is the wage rate per e¢ciency unit of labor and r t is the real interest rate. We denote the cross-sectional measure of households in country i at time t by © t;i . We can then de…ne a competitive equilibrium as follows.
De…nition 1 Given initial capital stocks and measures fK 0 ;i ; © 0;i g i2I , a competitive equilibrium are sequences of individual functions for the household, fW (t; ¢); c(t; ¢); l(t; ¢); a 0 (t; ¢)g sequences of production plans for …rms fL t;i ; K t;i g 1 t=0 ;i2I ; policies f¿ t;i ; ½ t;i ; b t;i g 1 t=0 ;i2 I ; prices fw t;i ; r t g 1 t=0;i2I , transfers fh t;i g 1 t=0; i2 I and measures f© t ;i g 1 t=0;i2I such that 1. Given prices, transfers and initial conditions, W (t; ¢) solves equation (17); and c(t; ¢); l(t; ¢); a 0 (t; ¢) are the associated policy functions.
Interest rates and wages satisfy
3. Transfers are given by
4. Government policies satisfy (15) and (16) in every period.
Markets clear in all
6. The cross-sectional measures © t;i evolve as
for all sets, J ; K; E; A, where the Markov transition functions P t;i are given by
and for newborns
De…nition 2 A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which all individual functions are constant over time and all aggregate variables grow at a constant rate.
Thought Experiment and Computation
We take as exogenous driving process a time-varying demographic structure in all regions under consideration. We allow country-speci…c survival, fertility and migration rates to change over time, inducing a demographic transition from an initial distribution towards a …nal steady state population distribution that arises once all changes in these rates have been completed and the population structure has settled down to its new steady state. Induced by this transition of the population structure is a transition path of the economies of the model, both in terms of aggregate variables as well as cross-sectional distributions of wealth and welfare. Summary measures of these changes will provide us with answers as to how the changes in the demographic structure of the economy, by changing returns to capital and wages, impact the distribution of welfare. We start computations in year 1950 assuming an arti…cial initial steady state. We then use data for a calibration period, 1950-2004, to determine several structural model parameters (see section 4). We then compute the model equilibrium from 1950 to 2300 (when the new steady state is assumed and veri…ed to be reached) and report simulation results for the main projection period of interest, from 2005 to 2080. For given structural model parameters we solve for the equilibrium using a modi…cation of the familiar Gauss-Seidel algorithm (see Ludwig, 2006 ). Throughout we take as length of the period one year. Appendix B contains a detailed description of our computational procedure.
Calibration
In this section we discuss our speci…cation of the model parameters. We need to choose parameters governing the demographic transition, the production technology, endowments and preferences, and the social security policy.
Demographics
Our demographic processes are based on the United Nations world population projections (United Nations, 2001). These numbers determine both the idiosyncratic survival probabilities as well as the relative sizes of total populations in the regions in all time periods under consideration. Figures 1 and 2 in the introduction summarized the main stylized facts from these population …gures, and appendix A describes in detail the methodology underlying our demographic projections.
Technology
We restrict the capital share parameter, ®, the growth rate of labor productivity, g, and the depreciation rate, ±, to be constant across all regions under consideration, whereas we allow technology levels Z i to di¤er across regions. The parameters characterizing production technologies in di¤erent countries can therefore be collected as
We estimate parameters ®; g and ± using U.S. NIPA data for a sample period of 1960-2004, set Z 1 = 1 and estimate Z 2 ; Z 3 taking data on relative labor productivity across regions. A more detailed description of our approach is given in appendix B.3. Table I summarizes the resulting parameter estimates. 
Endowments and Preferences
Households start their life with zero assets and are endowed with one unit of time per period. Labor productivity is given by the product of three components, a deterministic age component " j , a deterministic group component µ k and a stochastic idiosyncratic component´:
The age-productivity pro…le f" j g J j = 1 is taken from Hansen (1993) and generates an average life-cycle wage pro…le consistent with U.S. data. In experiments where we extend the retirement age we linearly extrapolate the e¢ciency pro…le beyond age 65:
Conditional on age, the natural logarithm of wages is given by
We choose the number of groups to be K = 2 and let groups be of equal size. We choose fµ 1 ; µ 2 g such that average-group productivity is equal to 1 and the variance of implied labor incomes of entrants to the labor market coincides with that reported by Storesletten et al. (2004) . This requires µ 1 = 0:57 and µ 2 = 1:43: For the idiosyncratic part of labor productivity we use a 2 state Markov chain with annual persistence of 0:98 and implied conditional variance of 8%, again motivated by the …ndings of Storesletten et al. (2004) . We assume that the period utility function is of the familiar CRRA form given by
where ¾ denotes the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion and where ! i measures the importance of consumption, relative to leisure in each country. Di¤erences in ! i across countries allow us to match simulated hours worked to the actual data separately for each country. In addition we have to specify the time discount factor of households which we restrict to be identical across countries. The preference parameters can accordingly be summarized as
We assume ¾ = 1 such that utility is separable between consumption and leisure, and determine the value of the discount rate by matching the average simulated capital-output ratio to U.S. data for the period 1960-2004. The consumption share parameters ! i are estimated by matching simulated average hours worked in the regions of our model to the data. A more detailed description of our methodology is given in appendix B.3. 
Social Security System
Our benchmark model contains no social security system. The version of the model used most prominently in our welfare calculations contains the PAYGO social security system, uses historical data for social security tax rates in the three regions of interest until 2004 and then freezes future contribution rates at their 2004 levels. Bene…ts adjust to achieve budget balance. In the alternative scenario of …xed replacement rates we again use historical region-speci…c data on contribution rates to back out constructed replacement rates until 2004 and then …x replacement rates in the future to their 2004 values. Tax rates increase to assure budget balance of the social security system. Data for calibrating the social security system are taken from various sources. For the U.S., we calculate social security contribution rates from NIPA data taken from the BEA (Table 3 .6). It is more di¢cult to obtain data for the other world regions. We proxy the time path of social security contribution rates by using time path information on total labor costs taken from the BLS and scale these data by social security contribution rates from the OECD for the other regions of interest.
Results for the Benchmark Model
In order to isolate the direct e¤ects of demographic changes on returns to capital, international capital ‡ows, and the distribution of wealth and welfare we …rst abstract from social security. In section 5.5 we then quantify the additional e¤ects that are implied by the adjustments of social security parameters to demographic change. In the benchmark scenario we also assume that capital ‡ows freely only between regions in the OECD, and we document in section 6.1 how our results are a¤ected if these regions would be closed economies.
Steady State Comparison
In order to obtain …rst sense for the impact of changes in demographics on the economy, (7) in the analysis of the simple model already showed, the long run consequences for output (income) per capita are less clear. On the one hand, output per worker increases substantially (due to a shrinking population, capital deepening and slightly increased age-speci…c labor supply shares), but, on the other hand, the fraction of the population that works declines. Table III demonstrates that detrended output per capita declines slightly in the long run, suggesting that the aging e¤ect dominates the capital deepening e¤ect. The e¤ects documented in table III incorporate the entire demographic transition. In our subsequent analysis we now zoom in on our main period of interest, the next 75 years. Since only a part of the dramatic aging of the population falls into this period we expect the same qualitative, but quantitatively smaller e¤ects.
Dynamics of Aggregate Statistics
In …gure 3 we display the evolution of the real return to capital from 2000 to 2080: In the same …gure we plot, as a summary measure of the age structure of the population, the fraction of the world adult population with age above 65 (by assumption these agents are retired in our model); this statistic is one minus the working age to population ratio. We observe that the rate of world-wide return to capital is predicted to fall by almost 1 percentage point in the next 60 years 6 Output per capita declines least for the EU in the long run since hours worked per person decline least. This is due to the assumption that in the long run, towards the new steady state, fertility rates in the EU will rebound so that the decrease in working age to population ratios is roughly the same in the US and the EU in the long run. In addition, working households increase their hours by more in the EU, relative to the US since their initial steady state level of labor supply is lower and thus they face lower marginal costs of working extra hours.
Since the rebound of fertility rates in the EU does not occur in the next 75 years and thus working-age to population ratios decline much more strongly in the EU than in the US in the next 80 years, the transition analysis will paint a di¤erent picture along this dimension. and then to settle down at that lower level. This is exactly what we would have expected, given the qualitative results from the simple model in section 2, and given the fact that so far we abstract from social security (reform). Pre-tax wages are related to the interest rate by
and thus de-trended (by productivity growth) real wages follow exactly the inverse path of interest rates, documented in …gure 3. These de-trended wages are predicted to increase by roughly 4% between 2000 and 2080 in all regions in our model.
In …gure 4 we plot the evolution of de-trended output per capita in the three regions, normalized to 1 in the year 2000. Notice that "per capita" here refers to the adult population aged 20 to 95. We observe substantial declines of 7 ¡ 13% in the three regions. The decline is least pronounced in the U.S., since there the decrease of the fraction of households in working age is more modest after 2030, as we saw in …gure 2. During the transition period from 2005-80, the negative e¤ects of decreasing working age to population ratios therefore dominate the positive e¤ects on output per worker (see the discussion of equation (7) in the analysis of the simple model). 
Quantifying International Capital Flows
In order to analyze the direction and size of international capital ‡ows we will document the evolution of the net foreign asset position and the current account of the countries/regions under consideration. As in the simple model, the current account is given by the change in the net foreign asset position and thus by the di¤erence of country i's saving and investment 7 C A t; i = F t+1;i ¡ F t;i = S t;i ¡ I t;i :
When reporting these statistics we always divide them by output Y t;i : We start with investigating national saving and investment rates and then discuss implied the current account and net foreign asset positions. 7 Note that in a closed economy Ft;i = Ct;i = 0; and that in a balanced growth path of an open economy CA t;i = g (A t;i ¡ K t;i ): Furthermore net asset positions and current accounts evidently have to sum to 0 across regions: ? The most direct e¤ect of an aging population is that labor, as a factor of production, becomes scarce. As a result, for unchanged aggregate saving the return to capital has to fall and gross wages have to rise. This is what we observe in …gure 3. However, the decline in interest rates may reduce the incentives of households to save, depending on the relative size of the income and substitution e¤ect. In addition, as our simple model suggests, with the aging of society the age composition of the population shifts towards older households, who are dissavers in our life cycle model. Consequently savings rates in all regions in our model decline over time, as shown in …gure 5. For the next 20 years the fall in savings rates is most pronounced for the U.S., because there, during this time period, the large cohort of baby boomers moves into retirement. The same is true for other regions of the world, albeit to a lesser degree on average 8 . After the large cohort of baby boomers have left the economy (i.e. died) the U.S. saving rate is predicted to rebound (in about 25 to 35 years) and then to stabilize, whereas in the European Union and the rest of the OECD savings rates continue to fall until about 2040 and then stabilize.
The other side of the medal (that is, of the current account) is the investment behavior in the di¤erent regions. Given that savings rates decline globally due to population aging investment rates have to do so as well on average, since the world current account has to balance to 0: As the population ages and the labor force declines it is optimal to reduce the capital stock with which these fewer workers work. Thus investment rates fall. Figure 6 demonstrates this fall for all regions, but also shows that the fall is by far the least pronounced for the U.S. Furthermore, in the U.S., the investment rate stops to fall by about 2020, roughly a decade earlier than its saving rate. This is due to the fact that the fall in the working age to population ratio is completed around that date in the U.S. On the other hand, in the EU and the rest of the OECD this ratio continues to fall until 2035. Since capital-(e¤ective) labor ratios have to be equalized, capital allocated to these regions has to fall (relative to the U.S.) and so do investment rates in these regions. Figure 7 shows a very clear deterioration of the current account of the U.S. of about 2% of GDP that is expected to occur in the next 30 years, as capital ‡ows from the European Union and, with a slight time delay, from the rest of the OECD, into the U.S. By 2040 this process is completed and the current account of all countries returns to roughly 0 from that point on. The predicted deterioration in the U.S. current account is due to an investment rate that falls less than in other countries (since the population in the US ages slower and thus the labor force falls less) as well as a (temporary) sharp decline in the U.S. savings rate in the next 20 years due to the gradual retirement of the baby boomers (see again …gures 5 and 6). Finally …gure 8 shows the evolution of the net foreign asset position, relative to GDP, in the three regions of our model. The European Union, as the oldest region, has a positive net asset position and thus provides capital to both the rest of the OECD and, increasingly, to the U.S.. As the U.S. current account is strongly negative during the years 2020 and 2040, the U.S. net foreign asset position reaches a trough of about ¡36% in about 2040. Thus the qualitative results from the quantitative model are in line with the predictions of the simple model, coupled with the level and dynamics of the working age to population ratio in the di¤erent regions documented in …gure 2.
Distributional and Welfare Consequences of Demographic Change
In the previous sections we have documented substantial changes in factor prices induced by the aging of the population, amounting to a decline of about 1 percentage point in real returns to capital and an increase in gross wages of about 4% in the next decades. In this section we want to quantify the distributional and welfare e¤ects emanating from these changes.
Evolution of Inequality
In …gure 9 we display the evolution of income inequality over time in the three regions. Income is composed of labor income (which later will include pension income) and capital income as well as transfers from accidental bequests.
We observe a signi…cant increase in income inequality between 2000 and 2080; of about 5 points in the Gini coe¢cient for the EU and the ROECD and 3.5 points in the U.S.. The reason for this increase is mainly a compositional e¤ect. Retired households have signi…cantly lower income on average than households in working age. The demographic transition towards more retired households therefore is bound to increase inequality, especially in those regions where the increase in the fraction of retired households among the population is very pronounced. This explains the more modest increase in income inequality in the U.S.. Note that consumption inequality follows income inequality trends fairly closely in the three regions (and thus is not shown here), but increases in consumption inequality are less pronounced. Also notice that the ordering of countries in the …gure will be reversed once we add pension systems -then, The fact that it is not a rise in capital income inequality that drives the increase in total income inequality becomes clear when plotting wealth inequality over time. There is no discernible increase in the same period; evidently the same is true for capital income inequality since capital income is proportional to wealth.
In contrast to income, wealth follows a hump-shaped pattern over the life cycle (on average), with the elderly and the young being wealth-poor. Thus, in contrast to income inequality, the aging of the population does not lead to an increase in wealth inequality, since the demographic change increases the fraction of the elderly, but reduces the fraction of the young. Consequently income and wealth inequality do not follow the same trend over time, nor is the ranking in inequality across regions the same for income and wealth.
We therefore conclude that the opposite general equilibrium e¤ects on wages and interest rates have little impact on the income and wealth distribution across generations. 
Welfare Consequences of the Demographic Transition
A household's welfare is a¤ected by two consequences of demographic change. First, her lifetime utility changes because her own survival probabilities increase; this is in part what triggers the aging of the population. Second, due to the demographic transition she faces di¤erent factor prices and government transfers and taxes (from the social security system and from accidental bequests) than without changes in the demographic structure. Speci…cally, households face a path of declining interest rates and increasing wages, relative to the situation without a demographic transition.
We want to isolate the welfare consequences of the second e¤ect. For this we compare lifetime utility of agents born and already alive in 2005 under two di¤er-ent scenarios. For both scenarios we …x a household's individual survival probabilities at their 2005 values; of course they fully retain their age-dependence. Then we solve each household's problem under two di¤erent assumptions about factor prices (and later taxes/transfers, once we have introduced social security). Let W (t; i; j; k;´; a) denote the lifetime utility of an agent at time t¸2005 in country i with individual characteristics (j; k;´;a) that faces the sequence of equilibrium prices as documented in the previous section, but constant 2005 survival probabilities, and let W 200 5 (t; i; j; k;´;a) denote the lifetime utility of the same agent that faces prices and taxes/transfers that are held constant at their 2005 value. Finally, denote by g(t; i; j; k;´;a) the percentage increase in consumption that needs to be given to an agent (t; i; j;k;´; a) at each date and contingency in her remaining lifetime (keeping labor supply allocations …xed) at …xed prices to make her as well o¤ as under the situation with changing prices. 9 Positive numbers of g(t; i; j; k;´; a) thus indicate that households obtain welfare gains from the general equilibrium e¤ects of the demographic changes, negative numbers mean welfare losses. Of particular interest are the numbers g(t = 56;i; j = 0; k;´; a = 0); that is, the welfare consequences for newborn agents in 2005 (t = 56) (remember that newborns start their life with zero assets). Table IV documents these numbers for type 1 for the U.S., di¤erentiated by their productivity shock´. The results for type 2 are nearly identical. We make several observations. First, newborn agents experience welfare gains from changing factor prices and transfers induced by the demographic transition. Apart from changing preferences through higher longevity (an effect we control for in our welfare calculations) the demographic transition substantially increases the real wage over time, reduces the interest rate and …rst increases and then (after 2040) somewhat reduces transfers from accidental bequests. The e¤ect from changes in transfers is small, at least for newborns. The dominating e¤ect for newborn agents is the substantial increase in wages, partially because these agents have not yet accumulated assets and thus do not su¤er from a loss of capital income on already accumulated …nancial wealth, in contrast to older households. Of course, a lower interest rate makes it harder for these households to accumulate assets for retirement. Since borrowing is ruled out the decline in interest rates alone therefore has unambiguously negative consequences for welfare.
Second, agents born with low productivity experience somewhat higher welfare gains than agents that start their working life with high productivity. Low productivity agents expect higher productivity in the future, and thus bene…t more strongly from the increasing wage pro…le induced by the demographic 9 For the Cobb-Douglas utility speci…cation for ¾ 6 = 1 the number g(t; i; j; k;´; a) can easily be computed as g(t; i; j; k;´; a) = ? W(t; i; j; k;´; a) W2005(t; i; j; k;´; a)
A similar expression holds for ¾ = 1:
1 0 The welfare consequences are very similar for other countries and type k2: In fact, in the benchmark model the only di¤erence across countries and types stems from accidental bequests, which are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion and whose dynamics varies slightly across countries. Since these transfers are small in magnitude, however, so are the crosscountry and cross-type di¤erences in welfare.
transition than the currently highly productive, whose productivity is going to fall in expectation. Given that the welfare impact of changing factor prices constitutes a tradeo¤ between increasing wages and falling returns to capital one would expect that those members of society for whom labor income constitutes a smaller part of (future) resources than capital income bene…t less from the demographic transition. An advantage of our model with uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks and thus endogenous intra-cohort wealth heterogeneity is that it allows us to document how the welfare consequences are distributed across the population, both across and within cohorts. Figure 11 plots the welfare gains for agents of age 60 in 2005. These households have most of their working life behind them, thus are fairly una¤ected by the wage changes, and simply experience lower returns on their accumulated savings. We see that agents in this cohort su¤er welfare losses which increase substantially by the amount of …nancial assets they have already accumulated. To give a sense of how many agents there are at di¤erent points in the asset distribution, the support of this distribution for the 60 year old ranges roughly to a = 12 (about 19 times GDP per capita); with median asset levels around 4 (10) times GDP per capita for the low´-low (high) type agents and about 4:1 (10:8) times GDP per capita for the high´-low (high) type agents. Overall, a fraction of 38 percent of agents economically alive in 2005 gain from the changing factor prices. These tend to be young agents with little assets and currently low labor productivity.
The Role of Social Security (and its Reform)
So far, we completely abstracted from government policies. While it is not obvious a priori what the interaction of demographic changes and public policies is in general, it is abundantly clear from policy debates that at least one large social program is strongly a¤ected by it: social security.
An idealized pay as you go public pension system can respond to an increase in the share of pensioners in the population by (a combination of) at least three ways: cutting bene…ts, increasing social security contribution rates or increasing the retirement age. While a likely response will include all elements, we now present results for the model with a PAYGO social security system that responds to population aging by either holding tax rates …xed (and thus cutting bene…ts), by holding replacement rates …xed (and thus raising taxes), or by increasing the retirement age. 11 Because of the strong in ‡uence of a public pension system on private savings behavior, we expect that these di¤erent reform scenarios may have substantially di¤erent implications for the evolution of factor prices and the size and direction of international capital ‡ows as well as the distribution of welfare. This conjecture turns out to be correct. Note that for all exercises we re-calibrate production and preference parameters such that each economy (with the di¤erent social security systems) attains the same calibration targets for the 1950 to 2004 period
In table V we show how the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates and prices di¤ers across the various scenarios for social security. Comparing the no-social security scenario to a world with social security in which payroll tax rates are held constant (and thus bene…ts decline), we observe that changes in factor prices are roughly the same between the two scenarios. 1 2 One big di¤erence, however, is the change in social security bene…ts required to cope with the demographic transition, which implies a decline in replacement rates by about 8 percentage points in the scenario with social security. Column 4 demonstrates that keeping pension bene…ts constant and adjusting taxes, on the other hand, has dramatic consequences for the evolution of interest rates and wages, relative to the benchmark scenario of …xing tax rates for social security. With …xed bene…ts the incentives to save for retirement are drastically reduced, relative to the benchmark. In addition, the substantial increase in tax rates of 7 percentage points and the corresponding reduction in after tax wages makes it harder to save. Therefore, despite the decline in the fraction of households in working age (and diminished incentives to work because of higher payroll taxes) now the capital-labor ratio remains roughly unchanged, because of the large reduction of household savings. Consequently the increase in wages and decline in returns is much less pronounced in this scenario. Finally, the last column of table V shows that an increase in the retirement age by 5 years, while leaving the change in factor prices roughly the same as in the benchmark, implies a much smaller decline in bene…ts as with a retirement age of 65 (see column 2). 13 Because of the expansion in labor supply output per capita falls signi…cantly less in this scenario than in all others. Given these substantial di¤erences in changes of allocations it is not surprising that the welfare consequences di¤er across these two scenarios as well. Table  VI summarizes the welfare losses from the demographic transition for newborns in the U.S. in 2005. 14 We …nd that, because of the decline in bene…ts or the increase in taxes, the welfare implications from the demographic change are less favorable in a world with social security than without. Especially the policy option of keeping bene…ts constant and letting tax rates increase implies large welfare losses from population aging for newborns, and even more so for future generations (not shown here). If, in contrast, the retirement age is increased to age 70, low-type households who enter the labor market unproductive are especially bene…tting. These households expect productivity to be higher in the future, face increasing wages and can exploit these longer now as they can work until age 70. It is therefore this group for which the increase in wages presents a good opportunity to inter-temporally substitute labor supply; consequently the bene…t of being able to work longer and thus the overall welfare gains from changing factor prices are largest for this group. For older agents the welfare losses from the demographic transition are signi…cantly smaller with an expansion of the retirement age, relative to simply holding contribution rates …xed and let bene…ts decline (results not shown). First, the decline in bene…ts is much smaller with an adjustment of the retirement age, and second, older households are given the option to endogenously respond to lower bene…t levels by expanding their labor supply for …ve more years. 1 3 A further increase in the retirement age has no substantial e¤ect on labor supply since households are not very productive beyond age 70 and thus choose to voluntarily retire around that age. 1 4 Note that the numbers of table VI do permit a meaningful welfare comparison of di¤erent social security reform scenarios to deal with the demographic change. In order to achieve this comparability in our welfare computations (and in these only) we always use the same parameters for all scenarios, those calibrated for the no social security benchmark.
The table does not, however, permit an assessment as to whether households are better o¤ in a world with or without social security. Thus we conclude that the option of increasing the retirement age leads to less welfare losses (and even welfare gains for some groups) from population aging than adjusting taxes or bene…ts alone.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we discuss how our results hinge on the assumption of the U.S. being open to international capital ‡ows from (parts of) the rest of the world, and we separately quantify the relative importance of changes in fertility and in mortality rates. Throughout these exercises, we keep social security tax rates and the retirement age constant and adjust bene…ts.
The Importance of Free International Capital Flows
Most analyses of the demographic transition and their allocative consequences are carried out in a closed economy. We therefore want to quantify the importance of international capital ‡ows for the extent to which the return to capital in the U.S. responds to a change in its demographic structure. 15 In order to do so we now show results derived under the assumption that the U.S. is a closed economy, and thus the capital stock used in its production has to be equal to total domestic asset accumulation. For an interpretation of these results it is important to keep in mind that, as …gure 2 showed, the U.S. ages more slowly than the EU and the rest of the OECD. We carry out the same experiment for the rest of the OECD since that region is most rapidly aging in the 2005 to 2080 time period. 1 6 1 5 Since the rest of the world is aging at similar speed as the EU and the ROECD, repeating our exercices by letting capital ‡ow freely also between the OECD and the rest of the world yields results that are very similar to the ones reported here. 1 6 Not surprisingly the results for the EU lie in between those for the U.S. and those for the ROECD, given that the EU ages faster than the U.S., but slower than the ROECD. Table VII shows that the U.S. imports the more pronounced population aging from the EU and the ROECD, in the sense that it experiences a more severe decline in rates of return in the U.S. as open economy, compared to as closed economy. Evidently wages follow the reverse pattern. Output per capita falls less in the open economy because both labor input and capital used in U.S. production decline by less between 2005 and 2080 than in the closed economy. For capital, another way of stating this fact is that in the closed economy the net foreign asset position of the U.S. is constant over time (and equal to zero), whereas in the open economy it is declining over time, as more capital is ‡owing into the U.S. (or less savings out of it) in 2080 than in 2005: For the rest of the OECD the pattern is exactly the reverse, and the e¤ects are somewhat more sizeable. This region, being the fastest aging in the OECD, would experience a substantially bigger fall in rates of return (and substantially larger increase in real wages) as a closed economy. Measured by the decline in the return to capital, the U.S. therefore imports some of the e¤ects of more pronounced aging of the population in Europe and the rest of the OECD, while the ROECD exports it into the EU and especially into the U.S..
How are the welfare implications of the demographic change impacted by the degree of openness to international capital ‡ows? Table VIII demonstrates that for the U.S. the welfare implications of population aging are hardly a¤ected by whether it is an open or a closed economy. 17 In the ROECD, on the other hand, newborns have signi…cantly higher welfare gains in the closed, compared to the open economy, because in the former case the increase in wages is substantially stronger than in the latter. 
Decomposing the E¤ects of Changes in Fertility and Mortality
The demographic transition is caused both by changes in fertility and mortality rates. In this section we decompose our results into the part that is due to the decline in mortality rates and the part that is due to a decline in fertility rates. In order to carry out such a decomposition we have to keep in mind that in 2005 the population of our economy is not stationary, and thus changes in its structure would occur even when mortality and fertility rates are held constant at their 2005 values. In order to account for these changes we …rst compute the consequences from population aging assuming that mortality and fertility rates stay constant at their 2005 levels. By this, we isolate the impact of the population dynamics stemming from the nonstationary population structure in 2005. We then in addition let either mortality or fertility rates change in accordance with UN predictions and report the incremental change (over and above the pure population dynamics) induced by the change in either mortality or fertility rates. Absent strong interaction e¤ects the changes observed in the benchmark model are then the sum of the pure population dynamics e¤ect, the incremental effect from changes in fertility rates and the incremental e¤ect from changes in mortality rates. Table IX provides the outcome of this decomposition exercise and shows that the main sources of changes in factor prices and other aggregates between 2005 and 2080, at least in the U.S., come from changes in mortality rates (column 4 of table IX), and from the fact that past fertility and mortality rates have led to a population structure that would imply an aging U.S. even absent any further changes in fertility and mortality rates (column 2). In fact, since for the U.S. fertility rates (including migration rates) are predicted to increase slightly in the near future, the e¤ect from only changing fertility rates is to make the U.S. younger (see column 3). We also observe that indeed the consequences of the demographic change can be almost perfectly be linearly dissected into to a pure composition e¤ect, a fertility rate e¤ect and a mortality rate e¤ect, as columns 2-4 roughly sum to column 5, our benchmark results documented in section 5.
Table IX also shows that future predicted changes in fertility and mortality rates have substantially di¤erent impacts on interest rates r and savings rates sr. The strong decline in mortality rates alone makes people live longer and thus forces them to save more, but on the other hand shifts the population towards older cohorts (which tend to be dis-savers). On net, the savings rate increases slightly. Since the fraction of the population in working age declines substantially (see the change in wapr in column 4), the capital-labor ratio increases, and with it wages; the rate of return falls as a consequence of declining mortality rates. In contrast, while an increase in fertility also increases the savings rate (since it shifts the population towards those that save, rather than dis-save), it also increases aggregate labor supply by enlarging the labor force. Thus the change in fertility rates alone reduces the capital-labor ratio and thus raises interest rates and reduces real wages. Overall, while predicted future changes in fertility rates are small and thus do not a¤ect aggregates between 2005 and 2080 substantially, the large decline in mortality rates predicted for the near future explains a substantial part of the increase in wages and the reduction of real interest rates, and thus, not surprisingly, a substantial part of the welfare consequences from population aging documented above.
Conclusions
In all major industrialized countries the population is aging, bringing with it a potentially large impact on the returns to the production factors capital and labor. This paper documents that the welfare consequences from the increase in wages and declines in rates of return can be substantial, in the order of up to 1% in lifetime consumption for newborns in 2005. These welfare gains for newborns however only come along if social security contribution rates are held constant at current levels. Households that have already accumulated assets, on the other hand, lose from the decline in rates of return. Increasing the mandatory retirement age by …ve years is shown to substantially mitigate these losses and to signi…cantly increase welfare gains of newborns.
The welfare gains for newborns (and losses for older generations) we document have to be added to (or traded o¤ against) the potential welfare gains from a longer (and healthier) life that is part of the source of the aging of the population in industrialized countries. While quantifying these welfare gains is beyond the scope of the current paper, our results indicate that overall living longer is likely to be a good thing for most households, at least if social security tax rates are not increased to keep bene…ts constant at current levels.
Another potentially bene…cial side e¤ect of a shrinking population (or a less rapidly growing population) that we have abstracted from and that may further enhance these welfare gains emanates from a reduction in the price of housing, assuming a supply that is at least somewhat inelastic. Since a serious quantitative evaluation of this e¤ect requires an appropriate model of housing (choice) and thus the need of adding a continuous state variable to our model, carrying out such an analysis is beyond the scope of current computational feasibility.
Finally, one important channel of adjustment to a shrinking labor force that we have abstracted from is endogenous human capital accumulation. Higher returns to human capital in the form of higher wages may make it optimal for young (and possibly older) households to obtain a better education, increasing the supply of e¤ective labor. This e¤ect may counteract some of the increase in the capital-labor ratio and hence mitigate the impact of population aging on factor prices. A quantitative exploration of this channel in a world with an aging population is left for future research.
A Details of the Demographic Projections
For each country i 2 f1; : : :; Ig we base our demographic data on the o¢cial demographic data and projections by the United Nations (United Nations, 2002). Starting from a given initial age-distribution of population, N 0; ¹ j ; i , in year 1950 for actual age ¹ j 2 f0; : : : ; 96g demography in each year t is given recursively by N t+1; ¹ j +1 ;i = N t; ¹ j ;i (s t; ¹ j ;i + m t; ¹ j; i ); m t; ¹ j ;i = 0 for ¹ j > 20
where m t; ¹ j ;i (f t; ¹ j ;i ) denotes time, age and country speci…c migration (fertility) rates. Our assumption, that migration rates are zero for ages above 20 allows us to treat newborns and immigrants in the economic model alike, compare Section 3.1.
The United Nations provide demographic data on N t; ¹ j; i , s t; ¹ j ;i and f t; ¹ j ;i on an annual basis for the years 1950-2050, but for age-groups of …ve only. We interpolate the initial distribution of the population, N 1 950 ; ¹ j ;i , and the data on s t; ¹ j ;i and f t; ¹ j ;i for all t 2 f1950; : : : ;2050g between age-groups to get agespeci…c data. As for migration we use the UN data on aggregate migration, M t;i , and assume that migration numbers are equally distributed across ages for ¹ j 2 f0; : : : ; 20g. These approximations result in a decent …t of our demographic model to the o¢cial aggregate UN …gures.
We further forecast demography beyond the UN forecasting horizon until 2300. First, while holding fertility rates constant, we assume that lifeexpectancy continues to increase at constant rates until year 2100. We then hold age-speci…c survival rates constant and assume that fertility rates adjust such that the number of newborns is constant in each successive year until 2200. This adjustment procedure implies that stationary population numbers are reached in year 2200. To support the steady state in our economic model, we hold demography constant for an additional 100 years until 2300.
B Computational Details B.1 Household Problem
The idea is to iterate on the Euler equation, using ideas developed in Carroll (2005) . The dynamic programming problem of the household reads as W (t; j; k; i;´; a)
(1 ¡ ¿ t;i )w t;i µ k " j´l + (1 + r t )(a + h t;i ) for j < jr b t;j; k; i + (1 + r t )(a + h t;i ) for j¸jr a 0 ; c¸0 and l 2 [0; 1]
where t indexes time, j indexes age, k indexes type, i indexes country,´denotes the idiosyncratic income shock and a denotes asset holdings. Following Deaton (1991), we denote by x "cash-on-hand" as the amount of resources available if l = 1,
(1 ¡ ¿ t;i )w t;i µ k " j´+ (1 + r t )(a + h t;i ) for j < jr b t;j ;k ;i + (1 + r t )(a + h t;i ) for j¸jr 
and the envelope condition reads as V x (t; j; k; i;´; x) = u 0 (c)
We can therefore de…ne the intra-temporal Euler equation between consumption and leisure as u 1¡l¸u c w t;i (1 ¡ ¿ t;i )µ k " j= if l > 0 and a 0 > 0
from which, for the family of Cobb-Douglas utility functions, we can get an explicit solution for leisure in terms of consumption and wages as 1 ¡ l = 1 ¡ l (c; w t;i (1 ¡ ¿ t;i )µ k " j´) if l > 0 and a 0 > 0
Our algorithm operates on (20) , (22) and (24).
1. De…ne a type-independent grid for savings G A = f0; a 2 ; :: : ; a n a g 2. De…ne a type-dependent grid on x for the last generation The updating of the value function again involves interpolation.
B.2 The Aggregate Model
For a given r £ 1 vectorã of structural model parameters, we …rst solve for an "arti…cial" initial steady state in period t = 0 which gives an initial distribution of assets. We thereby presume that households assume prices to remain constant for all periods t 2 f0; : :: ; T g and are then surprised by the actual price changes induced by the transitional dynamics. Next, we solve for the …nal steady state of our model which is reached in period T and supported by our demographic projections, see appendix A. For both steady states, we solve for the equilibrium of the aggregate model by iterating on the m £ 1 steady state price vectorP ss = [p1; :: : ; pm] 0 . p1 is the world marginal product of capital, rt + ±, p2; : : : ;pI+1 are social security contribution (or replacement) rates of each country, ¿ t;i (½ t;i ), and p I+2 ; : : : ; p 2I+1 are accidental bequests (as a ratio of wages) in each country, 4. De…ne the root-…nding problem as G(P ) =P ¡H(P ). Since T is large, this problem is substantially larger and we use the Gauss-Seidel-Quasi-Newton algorithm suggested in Ludwig (2006) to form and update guesses of an approximate Jacobi matrix of the system of m(T ¡2) non-linear equations.
B.3 Calibration of Structural Model Parameters
Calibration of structural model parameters is based on a procedure suggested in Ludwig (2005) . We split the r £ 1 vector of structural model parameters,
f is a vector of predetermined (…xed) parameters,
whereas the e £ 1 vectorã e is estimated by minimum distance (unconditional matching of moments using e moment conditions). Denote by u t (ã e ) = y t ¡ f (ã e ) for t = 0; : : :; T 0 the GMM error as the distance between data, y t , and model simulated (predicted) values, f (ã e ). Under the assumption that the model is correctly speci…ed, the restrictions on the GMM error can be written as 
We estimate the elements ofã e by setting these sample averages to zero (up to some tolerance level). In our economic model, the vectorã e is given bỹ ª e = [g; ±; ®;Z i ; : : : ;Z I ;¯; ! i ; : : :; ! I ] 0 :
We estimate the structural model parameters using data from various sources for the period 1960; :::; 2004, hence T 0 = 44. To identify the parameters of the production function, g; ±; ®, we use NIPA data for the U.S. on GDP, …xed assets, depreciation, wages and labor supply. Since our economic model restricts the capital-output ratio to be equal across countries, we restrict Z 1 = 1 and estimate Z i for i > 1 using data on labor productivity of country i relative to the U.S.. The remaining structural model parameters,¯; ! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 are estimated by simulation. We estimate¯by setting to zero the average distance between the simulated and the actual capital-output ratio and ! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 by setting to zero the average distance between simulated and actual average hours worked. The predetermined parameter of our model is the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion, ¾, which we set to one. In addition, we impose the restriction that the parameters, ®; ±; g;¯;¾, are constant across countries.
